Dynamic strategic information transmission

Mikhail Golosov, Vasiliki Skreta, Aleh Tsyvinski, Andrea Wilson

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

34 Scopus citations


This paper studies strategic information transmission in a finite horizon environment where, each period, a privately informed expert sends a message and a decision-maker takes an action. We show that communication in this dynamic environment drastically differs from a one-shot game. Our main result is that, under certain conditions, full information revelation is possible. We provide a constructive method to build such fully revealing equilibria; our result obtains with rich communication, in which non-contiguous types pool together, thereby allowing dynamic manipulation of beliefs. Essentially, conditioning future information release on past actions improves incentives for information revelation.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)304-341
Number of pages38
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Issue number1
StatePublished - May 2014

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics and Econometrics


  • Asymmetric information
  • Cheap talk
  • Dynamic strategic communication
  • Full information revelation


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