TY - JOUR
T1 - Dynamic strategic information transmission
AU - Golosov, Mikhail
AU - Skreta, Vasiliki
AU - Tsyvinski, Aleh
AU - Wilson, Andrea
N1 - Funding Information:
Golosov and Tsyvinski thank National Science Foundation and EIEF for hospitality. We thank Manuel Amador, Luca Anderlini, Sandeep Baliga, Abhijit Banerjee, Marco Battaglini, Andreas Blume, Adam Brandenburger, Amanda Friedenberg, Johannes Hőrner, Jerome Mathis, Ronny Razin, Larry Samuelson, and Andy Skrzypacz for inspiring discussions and comments. Skreta gratefully acknowledges financial support from French National Research Agency (A.N.R., project “Regulate to Promote Information Sharing”).
PY - 2014/5
Y1 - 2014/5
N2 - This paper studies strategic information transmission in a finite horizon environment where, each period, a privately informed expert sends a message and a decision-maker takes an action. We show that communication in this dynamic environment drastically differs from a one-shot game. Our main result is that, under certain conditions, full information revelation is possible. We provide a constructive method to build such fully revealing equilibria; our result obtains with rich communication, in which non-contiguous types pool together, thereby allowing dynamic manipulation of beliefs. Essentially, conditioning future information release on past actions improves incentives for information revelation.
AB - This paper studies strategic information transmission in a finite horizon environment where, each period, a privately informed expert sends a message and a decision-maker takes an action. We show that communication in this dynamic environment drastically differs from a one-shot game. Our main result is that, under certain conditions, full information revelation is possible. We provide a constructive method to build such fully revealing equilibria; our result obtains with rich communication, in which non-contiguous types pool together, thereby allowing dynamic manipulation of beliefs. Essentially, conditioning future information release on past actions improves incentives for information revelation.
KW - Asymmetric information
KW - Cheap talk
KW - Dynamic strategic communication
KW - Full information revelation
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U2 - 10.1016/j.jet.2013.12.012
DO - 10.1016/j.jet.2013.12.012
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84897098468
VL - 151
SP - 304
EP - 341
JO - Journal of Economic Theory
JF - Journal of Economic Theory
SN - 0022-0531
IS - 1
ER -