Dynamic lobbying: Evidence from foreign lobbying in the U.S. Congress

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

4 Scopus citations

Abstract

How do interest groups decide which member of Congress to target when decisions are made collectively? Do lobbying strategies change as legislation advances? Answering these questions is challenging due to a lack of systematic observations of lobbying contacts. I answer these questions using a novel data set constructed from reports submitted by lobbyists on behalf of South Korea regarding its free trade agreement with the United States for 10 years. I show that a diverse set of politicians are contacted but the timing, intensity, and strategy of lobbying contacts vary by politicians' institutional positions as well as their predisposed preferences for free trade.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)445-469
Number of pages25
JournalEconomics and Politics
Volume35
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Jul 2023
Externally publishedYes

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics and Econometrics

Keywords

  • foreign lobbying
  • free trade agreement
  • persuasion
  • U.S. congress

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