Abstract
Non-moral ignorance can exculpate: if Anne spoons cyanide into Bills coffee, but thinks she is spooning sugar, then Anne may be blameless for poisoning Bill. Gideon Rosen argues that moral ignorance can also exculpate: if one does not believe that ones action is wrong, and one has not mismanaged ones beliefs, then one is blameless for acting wrongly. On his view, many apparently blameworthy actions are blameless. I discuss several objections to Rosen. I then propose an alternative view on which many agents who act wrongly are blameworthy despite believing they are acting morally permissibly, and despite not having mismanaged their moral beliefs.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | Developing Deontology |
| Subtitle of host publication | New Essays in Ethical Theory |
| Publisher | John Wiley and Sons |
| Pages | 95-120 |
| Number of pages | 26 |
| ISBN (Print) | 9781444361940 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Mar 14 2012 |
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- General Arts and Humanities
Keywords
- Agents, as blameworthy
- Apparently blameworthy actions, being blameless
- Moral ignorance, whether it exculpates
- Moral obligation, moral truths relevant to actions
- Narrower conclusion
- Non-moral ignorance, exculpates
- Rosen's Broad Conclusion
- Rosen's argument
- moral knowledge and moral ignorance