Abstract
This article reviews and analyzes many arguments that are made on behalf of bicameralism. The tools used to make these arguments are the spatial model, the multilateral bargaining theory, and a game of incomplete information. The article attempts to distinguish the effects of bicameralism from the effects of other institutional features that often accompany it, such as differing terms of office and super-majoritarian requirements.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press |
| ISBN (Electronic) | 9780191577437 |
| ISBN (Print) | 9780199548477 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Jun 19 2008 |
| Externally published | Yes |
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- General Social Sciences
Keywords
- Bicameralism
- Effects
- Game of incomplete information
- Institutional features
- Multilateral bargaining theory
- Spatial model
- Super-majoritarian requirements
- Terms of office