Does Bicameralism Matter?

Michael Cutrone, Nolan McCarty

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

3 Scopus citations


This article reviews and analyzes many arguments that are made on behalf of bicameralism. The tools used to make these arguments are the spatial model, the multilateral bargaining theory, and a game of incomplete information. The article attempts to distinguish the effects of bicameralism from the effects of other institutional features that often accompany it, such as differing terms of office and super-majoritarian requirements.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationThe Oxford Handbook of Political Economy
PublisherOxford University Press
ISBN (Electronic)9780191577437
ISBN (Print)9780199548477
StatePublished - Jun 19 2008
Externally publishedYes

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • General Social Sciences


  • Bicameralism
  • Effects
  • Game of incomplete information
  • Institutional features
  • Multilateral bargaining theory
  • Spatial model
  • Super-majoritarian requirements
  • Terms of office


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