TY - JOUR
T1 - Dispute resolution institutions and strategic militarization
AU - Meirowitz, Adam
AU - Morelli, Massimo
AU - Ramsay, Kristopher W.
AU - Squintani, Francesco
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2019 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.
PY - 2019/2/1
Y1 - 2019/2/1
N2 - Engagement in a destructive war can be understood as the “punish-ment” for entering into a dispute. Institutions that reduce the chance that disputes lead to war make this punishment less severe. This may in-centivize hawkish policies like militarization and potentially offset the benefits of peace brokering. We study a model in which unmediated peace talks are effective at improving the peace chance for given militarization but lead to more militarization and ultimately to a higher incidence of war. Instead, a form of third-party mediation inspired by work of Myerson effectively brokers peace in emerged disputes and also minimizes equilibrium militarization.
AB - Engagement in a destructive war can be understood as the “punish-ment” for entering into a dispute. Institutions that reduce the chance that disputes lead to war make this punishment less severe. This may in-centivize hawkish policies like militarization and potentially offset the benefits of peace brokering. We study a model in which unmediated peace talks are effective at improving the peace chance for given militarization but lead to more militarization and ultimately to a higher incidence of war. Instead, a form of third-party mediation inspired by work of Myerson effectively brokers peace in emerged disputes and also minimizes equilibrium militarization.
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U2 - 10.1086/700761
DO - 10.1086/700761
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85059868635
SN - 0022-3808
VL - 127
SP - 378
EP - 418
JO - Journal of Political Economy
JF - Journal of Political Economy
IS - 1
ER -