Dispute resolution institutions and strategic militarization

Adam Meirowitz, Massimo Morelli, Kristopher W. Ramsay, Francesco Squintani

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

15 Scopus citations

Abstract

Engagement in a destructive war can be understood as the “punish-ment” for entering into a dispute. Institutions that reduce the chance that disputes lead to war make this punishment less severe. This may in-centivize hawkish policies like militarization and potentially offset the benefits of peace brokering. We study a model in which unmediated peace talks are effective at improving the peace chance for given militarization but lead to more militarization and ultimately to a higher incidence of war. Instead, a form of third-party mediation inspired by work of Myerson effectively brokers peace in emerged disputes and also minimizes equilibrium militarization.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)378-418
Number of pages41
JournalJournal of Political Economy
Volume127
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Feb 1 2019

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics and Econometrics

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