Abstract
Standard accuracy-based approaches to imprecise credences have the consequence that it is rational to move between precise and imprecise credences arbitrarily, without gaining any new evidence. Building on the Educated Guessing Framework of Horowitz (2019), we develop an alternative accuracy-based approach to imprecise credences that does not have this shortcoming. We argue that it is always irrational to move from a precise state to an imprecise state arbitrarily, however it can be rational to move from an imprecise state to a precise state arbitrarily.
Original language | English (US) |
---|---|
Pages (from-to) | 3-20 |
Number of pages | 18 |
Journal | Nous |
Volume | 56 |
Issue number | 1 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Mar 2022 |
Externally published | Yes |
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Philosophy
Keywords
- accuracy
- ambiguity aversion
- comparativism
- educated guesses
- formal epistemology
- imprecise probability
- the Principal Principle