TY - JOUR
T1 - Did robert bork understate the competitive impact of mergers? Evidence from consummated mergers
AU - Ashenfelter, Orley
AU - Hosken, Daniel
AU - Weinberg, Matthew
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2014 by The University of Chicago.
PY - 2014/8/1
Y1 - 2014/8/1
N2 - In The Antitrust Paradox, Robert Bork viewed most mergers as either competitively neutral or efficiency enhancing. In his view, only mergers creating a dominant firm or monopoly were likely to harm consumers. Bork was especially skeptical of oligopoly concerns resulting from mergers. In this paper, we provide a critique of Bork’s views on merger policy from The Antitrust Paradox. Many of Bork’s recommendations have been implemented over time and have improved merger analysis. Bork’s proposed horizontal merger policy, however, was too permissive. In particular, the empirical record shows that mergers in oligopolistic markets can raise consumer prices.
AB - In The Antitrust Paradox, Robert Bork viewed most mergers as either competitively neutral or efficiency enhancing. In his view, only mergers creating a dominant firm or monopoly were likely to harm consumers. Bork was especially skeptical of oligopoly concerns resulting from mergers. In this paper, we provide a critique of Bork’s views on merger policy from The Antitrust Paradox. Many of Bork’s recommendations have been implemented over time and have improved merger analysis. Bork’s proposed horizontal merger policy, however, was too permissive. In particular, the empirical record shows that mergers in oligopolistic markets can raise consumer prices.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84920873132&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84920873132&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1086/675862
DO - 10.1086/675862
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84920873132
SN - 0022-2186
VL - 57
SP - S67-S100
JO - Journal of Law and Economics
JF - Journal of Law and Economics
IS - S3
ER -