The paper charts the elaboration of statutes for the European Central Bank (ECB) in the lead-up to the Maastricht Treaty. The leading figures in formulating the new vision were central bankers themselves, first in the Delors Committee (1988-89) and then in the Committee of Central Bank Governors. The result of the dominant role of the central bankers was the prominent role given to central bank independence. The development of central banking corresponds with a broader international movement to produce a framework for managing globalization through the introduction of new rules but also by unburdening the political process by delegating responsibilities to transnational experts. The paper also examines why the ECB was not given an explicit role in bank supervision and regulation, as particularly the German Bundesbank feared that this would mean that the ECB would take on a lender of last-resort function that would generate moral hazard.
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Political Science and International Relations