TY - GEN
T1 - Deniable liaisons
AU - Narain, Abhinav
AU - Feamster, Nick
AU - Snoeren, Alex C.
PY - 2014/11/3
Y1 - 2014/11/3
N2 - People sometimes need to communicate directly with one another while concealing the communication itself. Existing systems can allow users to achieve this level of privacy in the wide-area Internet, but parties who are in close proximity (e.g., a public square or coffee shop) may want a lightweight communications channel with similar properties. Today, covert exchanges in local settings typically require the exchange of physical media or involve other forms of direct communication (e.g., conversations, blind drops); most, if not all, of these exchanges are observable: in other words, even if the message exchanges are confidential, they are not covert or deniable. We construct a local communications channel that is unobservable to everyone except the parties exchanging messages. To do so, we take advantage of the ubiquitous phenomenon of packet corruption in wireless networks, which provide deniable cover for message exchange between parties within radio range. The communicating parties use a shared secret to differentiate truly corrupted frames from those that hide messages; to other parties, messages appear as corrupted wireless frames. We tackle the challenge of designing the observable corruption patterns to ensure that an observer can neither link sender and receiver of a hidden message (unlinkability), nor determine so much as the existence of any hidden message (deniability). We present the design and implementation of a prototype system that achieves these properties using off-the-shelf 802.11 hardware, evaluate its performance, and assess its resilience to various attacks.
AB - People sometimes need to communicate directly with one another while concealing the communication itself. Existing systems can allow users to achieve this level of privacy in the wide-area Internet, but parties who are in close proximity (e.g., a public square or coffee shop) may want a lightweight communications channel with similar properties. Today, covert exchanges in local settings typically require the exchange of physical media or involve other forms of direct communication (e.g., conversations, blind drops); most, if not all, of these exchanges are observable: in other words, even if the message exchanges are confidential, they are not covert or deniable. We construct a local communications channel that is unobservable to everyone except the parties exchanging messages. To do so, we take advantage of the ubiquitous phenomenon of packet corruption in wireless networks, which provide deniable cover for message exchange between parties within radio range. The communicating parties use a shared secret to differentiate truly corrupted frames from those that hide messages; to other parties, messages appear as corrupted wireless frames. We tackle the challenge of designing the observable corruption patterns to ensure that an observer can neither link sender and receiver of a hidden message (unlinkability), nor determine so much as the existence of any hidden message (deniability). We present the design and implementation of a prototype system that achieves these properties using off-the-shelf 802.11 hardware, evaluate its performance, and assess its resilience to various attacks.
KW - Censorship
KW - Covert channels
KW - Wireless
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84910635487&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84910635487&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1145/2660267.2660340
DO - 10.1145/2660267.2660340
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:84910635487
SN - 9781450329576
T3 - Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security
SP - 525
EP - 536
BT - Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security
PB - Association for Computing Machinery
T2 - 21st ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, CCS 2014
Y2 - 3 November 2014 through 7 November 2014
ER -