Democracy-Enhancing Multilateralism

Robert O. Keohane, Stephen MacEdo, Andrew Moravcsik

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

369 Scopus citations

Abstract

International organizations are widely believed to undermine domestic democracy. Our analysis challenges this conventional wisdom, arguing that multilateral institutions can enhance the quality of national democratic processes, even in well-functioning democracies, in a number of important ways: by restricting the power of special interest factions, protecting individual rights, and improving the quality of democratic deliberation, while also increasing capacities to achieve important public purposes. The article discusses conflicts and complementarities between multilateralism and democracy, outlines a working conception of constitutional democracy, elaborates theoretically the ways in which multilateral institutions can enhance constitutional democracy, and discusses the empirical conditions under which multilateralism is most likely to have net democratic benefits, using contemporary examples to illustrate the analysis. The overall aim is to articulate a set of critical democratic standards appropriate for evaluating and helping to guide the reform of international institutions. pdfS0020818309090018a.pdf

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)1-31
Number of pages31
JournalInternational Organization
Volume63
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 2009

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Sociology and Political Science
  • Political Science and International Relations
  • Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management
  • Law

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Democracy-Enhancing Multilateralism'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this