Deliberative voting

Dino Gerardi, Leeat Yariv

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

72 Scopus citations

Abstract

We analyze a model of jury decision making in which jurors deliberate before casting their votes. We consider a wide range of voting institutions and show that deliberations render these equivalent with respect to the sequential equilibrium outcomes they generate. In particular, in the context of a jury setup, all voting rules excluding the two types of unanimity rules (one requiring a unanimous consensus to acquit, one requiring a unanimous consensus to convict) induce the same set of equilibria outcomes. We show the robustness of our results with respect to several restrictions on communication protocols and jurors' strategies. Furthermore, we demonstrate that our observations extend to practically all of the voting structures commonly studied in the voting literature. The paper suggests the importance of accounting for communication in models of collective choice.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)317-338
Number of pages22
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Volume134
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - May 1 2007
Externally publishedYes

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics and Econometrics

Keywords

  • Collective choice
  • Communication
  • Juries
  • Strategic voting

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