Decentralized interference channels with noisy feedback possess Pareto optimal Nash equilibria

Samir M. Perlaza, Ravi Tandon, H. Vincent Poor

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

2 Scopus citations

Abstract

In this paper, the price of anarchy (PoA) and the price of stability (PoS) of a game arising in a two-user decentralized interference channel (DIC) with noisy feedback in which transmit-receiver pairs seek an optimal individual transmission rate are fully characterized. In particular, it is shown that in all interference regimes, there always exists at least one Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium (NE). More specifically, there always exists an NE at which players maximize the network sum-rate and thus, the PoS of the corresponding game is always equal to one. A second result provides closed form expressions for the PoA, which allows the full characterization of the reduction of the sum rate due to the anarchic behavior of all transmitter-receiver pairs.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationISCCSP 2014 - 2014 6th International Symposium on Communications, Control and Signal Processing, Proceedings
PublisherIEEE Computer Society
Pages408-411
Number of pages4
ISBN (Print)9781479928903
DOIs
StatePublished - 2014
Event6th International Symposium on Communications, Control and Signal Processing, ISCCSP 2014 - Athens, Greece
Duration: May 21 2014May 23 2014

Publication series

NameISCCSP 2014 - 2014 6th International Symposium on Communications, Control and Signal Processing, Proceedings

Other

Other6th International Symposium on Communications, Control and Signal Processing, ISCCSP 2014
Country/TerritoryGreece
CityAthens
Period5/21/145/23/14

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Computer Networks and Communications
  • Signal Processing

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