| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 653-670 |
| Number of pages | 18 |
| Journal | Diplomatic History |
| Volume | 33 |
| Issue number | 4 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - 2009 |
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In: Diplomatic History, Vol. 33, No. 4, 2009, p. 653-670.
Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review
TY - JOUR
T1 - Détente and domestic politics
AU - Zelizer, Julian E.
N1 - Funding Information: Tough rhetoric did not suffice, however. The human rights aspect of the Helsinki agreements was overshadowed by the second component, in which the participating countries recognized the territorial claims of the Soviet Union over Eastern Europe. Conservatives were furious about this proclamation. Underestimating the political impact the statement would have in the United States, Ford believed that this part of the agreement merely acknowledged what had been a political reality since World War II. Upon signing the agreements, Ford proclaimed that “the era of confrontation that has divided Europe since the end of the Second World War may now be ending.”29 According to one Ford speechwriter, conservatives in America saw the agreement as “a ‘new Yalta.’ ”30 The final blow to Ford’s relationship with conservatives came in the fall of 1975 as a result of civil conflict in Angola. Following the announcement by the new government of Portugal in 1974 that they would withdraw from their former colonies, three factions attempted to take control of Angola and its oil: the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) which was supported by Cuba, Mozambique, and the Soviet Union; the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), which received support from China and Zaire and covert assistance from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); and the National Union for Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) which received support from South Africa and the United States (the CIA supported two factions). The administration provided covert assistance in this civil war in order to display that the U.S. government was still willing to take action even after Vietnam.31 Ford said that Soviet involvement in Angola was damaging the prospects for détente.32
PY - 2009
Y1 - 2009
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=68649104786&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=68649104786&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1111/j.1467-7709.2009.00805.x
DO - 10.1111/j.1467-7709.2009.00805.x
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:68649104786
SN - 0145-2096
VL - 33
SP - 653
EP - 670
JO - Diplomatic History
JF - Diplomatic History
IS - 4
ER -