Culpability and ignorance

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

171 Scopus citations

Abstract

When a person acts from ignorance, he is culpable for his action only if he is culpable for the ignorance from which he acts. The paper defends the view that this principle holds, not just for actions done from ordinary factual ignorance, but also for actions done from moral ignorance. The question is raised whether the principle extends to action done from ignorance about what one has most reason to do. It is tentatively proposed that the principle holds in full generality.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)61-84
Number of pages24
JournalProceedings of the Aristotelean Society
Volume103
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - 2003

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Philosophy

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Culpability and ignorance'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this