Culpability and ignorance

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When a person acts from ignorance, he is culpable for his action only if he is culpable for the ignorance from which he acts. The paper defends the view that this principle holds, not just for actions done from ordinary factual ignorance, but also for actions done from moral ignorance. The question is raised whether the principle extends to action done from ignorance about what one has most reason to do. It is tentatively proposed that the principle holds in full generality.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)61-84
Number of pages24
JournalProceedings of the Aristotelean Society
Issue number1
StatePublished - 2003

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Philosophy


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