TY - JOUR
T1 - Cross-National Support for the Welfare State Under Wealth Inequality
AU - Jensen, Amalie Sofie
AU - Wiedemann, Andreas
N1 - Funding Information:
The authors disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: We are grateful to ERC project no. 313673 (HHPOLITICS) for funding and to Ida Maria Hartmann for excellent research assistance.
Publisher Copyright:
© The Author(s) 2023.
PY - 2023
Y1 - 2023
N2 - Wealth is often more unequally distributed than income, and there are considerable differences across countries. In this paper, we argue that wealth inequality helps explain cross-national variation in support for (and the size of) the welfare state because assets serve as private insurance. When wealth, particularly liquid assets, is unequally distributed across the income spectrum and high-income groups hold most assets, strong reinforcing preferences in favor of or against social policies result in antagonistic welfare politics and less government spending. When assets are more equitably distributed across the income spectrum, cross-cutting preferences emerge as more people support either insurance or redistribution. Welfare politics is consensual and facilitates a broader welfare coalition and more government spending. We analyze original cross-national survey data from nine OECD countries and provide evidence in support of our argument. Our findings suggest that wealth inequality reshapes the role of income in structuring welfare politics.
AB - Wealth is often more unequally distributed than income, and there are considerable differences across countries. In this paper, we argue that wealth inequality helps explain cross-national variation in support for (and the size of) the welfare state because assets serve as private insurance. When wealth, particularly liquid assets, is unequally distributed across the income spectrum and high-income groups hold most assets, strong reinforcing preferences in favor of or against social policies result in antagonistic welfare politics and less government spending. When assets are more equitably distributed across the income spectrum, cross-cutting preferences emerge as more people support either insurance or redistribution. Welfare politics is consensual and facilitates a broader welfare coalition and more government spending. We analyze original cross-national survey data from nine OECD countries and provide evidence in support of our argument. Our findings suggest that wealth inequality reshapes the role of income in structuring welfare politics.
KW - European politics
KW - political economy
KW - social welfare programs
KW - wealth inequality
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U2 - 10.1177/00104140231168364
DO - 10.1177/00104140231168364
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85153173989
SN - 0010-4140
JO - Comparative Political Studies
JF - Comparative Political Studies
ER -