TY - JOUR
T1 - Coordinated data-injection attack and detection in the smart grid
T2 - A detailed look at enriching detection solutions
AU - Cui, Shuguang
AU - Han, Zhu
AU - Kar, Soummya
AU - Kim, Tung T.
AU - Poor, H. Vincent
AU - Tajer, Ali
N1 - Funding Information:
This work was in part supported by DoD-AFOSR under grant FA9550-09-1-0107, DoD-DTRA under grant HDTRA1-07-1-0037, ARO under MURI grant W911NF-11-1-0036, ONR under grant N00014-09-1-0342, Qatar National Research Fund, and NSF under grants DMS-1118605 CNS-1117560, ECCS-1028782, CNS-0953377, and CNS-0905556.
PY - 2012
Y1 - 2012
N2 - A smart grid improves the efficiency of power grids via the aid of modern communication, signal processing, and control technologies. While smart grid integration enables power grid networks to be smarter, it also increases the risk of cyberattacks due to the strong dependence on the cyberinfrastructure in the overall system. In this article, the coordinated datainjection attack detection problem in the smart grid is considered. Specifically, the data-injection attack model is first introduced and a thorough survey of existing detection methods is then given. Afterward, three important efforts to enrich the detection solution are presented in detail: 1) attacker versus defender dynamics, where possible interactive attack and defense strategies are discussed in the context of secure phasor measurement unit (PMU) placement 2) distributed attack detection and state recovery, where the focus is how to achieve the optimal centralized performance with a distributed approach 3) quickest detection (QD), where the trade off between the detection speed and detection performance is studied. A list of associated key open problems in this area is then presented to conclude this article.
AB - A smart grid improves the efficiency of power grids via the aid of modern communication, signal processing, and control technologies. While smart grid integration enables power grid networks to be smarter, it also increases the risk of cyberattacks due to the strong dependence on the cyberinfrastructure in the overall system. In this article, the coordinated datainjection attack detection problem in the smart grid is considered. Specifically, the data-injection attack model is first introduced and a thorough survey of existing detection methods is then given. Afterward, three important efforts to enrich the detection solution are presented in detail: 1) attacker versus defender dynamics, where possible interactive attack and defense strategies are discussed in the context of secure phasor measurement unit (PMU) placement 2) distributed attack detection and state recovery, where the focus is how to achieve the optimal centralized performance with a distributed approach 3) quickest detection (QD), where the trade off between the detection speed and detection performance is studied. A list of associated key open problems in this area is then presented to conclude this article.
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U2 - 10.1109/MSP.2012.2185911
DO - 10.1109/MSP.2012.2185911
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85032751507
SN - 1053-5888
VL - 29
SP - 106
EP - 115
JO - IEEE Signal Processing Magazine
JF - IEEE Signal Processing Magazine
IS - 5
M1 - 6279584
ER -