Abstract
Questions: Can cooperation be enhanced if players whose performance is higher than the mean are forced to pay an additional cost in each generation? Mathematical methods: Analysis of replicator dynamics with mutation. The ESS distribution of cooperation level is obtained. Key assumptions: Players engage in a cooperative dilemma game, and at the end of each generation those whose performance is higher than the mean are forced to pay an additional cost. Conclusions: Without mutation, the entire population eventually conforms to a single cooperation level determined by the initial composition of the population. With mutation, there is an equilibrium distribution of cooperation, which has a peak at an intermediate level of cooperation. Whether it is institutionalized such as tax or just a social custom, fitness adjustment based ultimately on people's 'envy' is able to maintain cooperation.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 1023-1041 |
Number of pages | 19 |
Journal | Evolutionary Ecology Research |
Volume | 9 |
Issue number | 6 |
State | Published - Oct 1 2007 |
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Ecology, Evolution, Behavior and Systematics
Keywords
- Distribution of cooperation level
- Envy
- Evolution of cooperation
- Fitness adjustment
- Punishment