Abstract
Sometimes it seems that an existing bearer of value should be preserved even though it could be destroyed and replaced with something of equal or greater value. How can this conservative intuition be explained and justified? This paper distinguishes three answers, which I call existential, attitudinal, and object-affecting conservatism. I raise some problems for existential and attitudinal conservatism, and suggest how they can be solved by object-affecting conservatism.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 180-194 |
| Number of pages | 15 |
| Journal | Australasian Journal of Philosophy |
| Volume | 100 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - 2022 |
| Externally published | Yes |
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Philosophy
Keywords
- G.A. Cohen
- conservatism
- noninstrumental value
- personal value
- replacement
- valuing