TY - JOUR
T1 - Conflict and deterrence under strategic risk
AU - Chassang, Sylvain
AU - Miquel, Gerard PadŕO I.
N1 - Funding Information:
∗We are grateful to Sandeep Baliga, Micael Castanheira, Jon Eguia, Joan Esteban, Christian Hellwig, Matt Jackson, Patrick Legros, David Miller, Andrea Prat, Jesse Shapiro, Joel Sobel, and Flavio Toxvaerd for extensive comments and conversations. The paper significantly benefited from feedback by the editor and three anonymous referees, as well as from seminar participants at Cambridge University, Chicago Booth, Rochester, Sussex University, Université Libre de Bruxelles, UC Berkeley, and UCSD and conference participants at the 2008 AEA meetings, the Polarization and Conflict Group Meeting at LSE, and the UC Berkeley Conference on Endogenous Institutions and Conflict, as well as the ESSET meeting at Gerzensee. Gerard Padró i Miquel gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Economic and Social Research Council under the First Grant scheme, RES-061-250170. Andrew Robinson provided excellent research assistance. All remaining errors are, of course, our own.
PY - 2010/11
Y1 - 2010/11
N2 - We examine the determinants of cooperation and the effectiveness of deterrence when fear is a motive for conflict. We contrast results obtained in a complete information setting with those obtained in a setting with strategic risk, where players have different information about their environment. These two strategic settings allow us to identify and distinguish the role of predatory and preemptive incentives as determinants of cooperation and conflict. In our model, weapons unambiguously facilitate peace under complete information. In contrast, under strategic risk, we show that increases in weapon stocks can have a nonmonotonic effect on the sustainability of cooperation. We also show that under strategic risk, asymmetry in military strength can facilitate peace, and that anticipated peacekeeping interventions may improve incentives for peaceful behavior.
AB - We examine the determinants of cooperation and the effectiveness of deterrence when fear is a motive for conflict. We contrast results obtained in a complete information setting with those obtained in a setting with strategic risk, where players have different information about their environment. These two strategic settings allow us to identify and distinguish the role of predatory and preemptive incentives as determinants of cooperation and conflict. In our model, weapons unambiguously facilitate peace under complete information. In contrast, under strategic risk, we show that increases in weapon stocks can have a nonmonotonic effect on the sustainability of cooperation. We also show that under strategic risk, asymmetry in military strength can facilitate peace, and that anticipated peacekeeping interventions may improve incentives for peaceful behavior.
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U2 - 10.1162/qjec.2010.125.4.1821
DO - 10.1162/qjec.2010.125.4.1821
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:78649900335
VL - 125
SP - 1821
EP - 1858
JO - Quarterly Journal of Economics
JF - Quarterly Journal of Economics
SN - 0033-5533
IS - 4
ER -