TY - JOUR
T1 - Confirming the absence of nuclear warheads via passive gamma-ray measurements
AU - Lepowsky, Eric
AU - Jeon, Jihye
AU - Glaser, Alexander
N1 - Funding Information:
The authors are grateful to the students in MAE 354 (Unmaking the Bomb: The Science and Technology of Nuclear Nonproliferation, Disarmament, and Verification) offered at Princeton University in Spring 2020. Several of the ideas and concepts presented here were first articulated as part of this course. We also thank Danielle Hauck who visited the class in April 2020 to share with us her thoughts on “Absence Measurements in Treaty Verification”. Joe Grand, founder of Grand Idea Studio and former member of the hacker collective L0pht Heavy Industries, gave two guest lectures on side-channel attacks that further underscored the potential benefits of absence-measurement regimes. The authors thank the reviewers for their valuable feedback and suggestions. Eric Lepowsky’s contributions to this project have been supported by the National Science Foundation Graduate Research Fellowship under Grant No. DGE-2039656 . This work was partly supported by the Consortium for Monitoring, Technology, and Verification under Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration award number DE-NA0003920 .
Funding Information:
The authors are grateful to the students in MAE 354 (Unmaking the Bomb: The Science and Technology of Nuclear Nonproliferation, Disarmament, and Verification) offered at Princeton University in Spring 2020. Several of the ideas and concepts presented here were first articulated as part of this course. We also thank Danielle Hauck who visited the class in April 2020 to share with us her thoughts on ?Absence Measurements in Treaty Verification?. Joe Grand, founder of Grand Idea Studio and former member of the hacker collective L0pht Heavy Industries, gave two guest lectures on side-channel attacks that further underscored the potential benefits of absence-measurement regimes. The authors thank the reviewers for their valuable feedback and suggestions. Eric Lepowsky's contributions to this project have been supported by the National Science Foundation Graduate Research Fellowship under Grant No. DGE-2039656. This work was partly supported by the Consortium for Monitoring, Technology, and Verification under Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration award number DE-NA0003920.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2020
PY - 2021/2/21
Y1 - 2021/2/21
N2 - Arms-control agreements between the United States and Russia negotiated after the end of the Cold War have imposed limits on the number of deployed strategic nuclear weapons. Verification of these agreements has relied on onsite inspections, sometimes supported by radiation detection techniques to confirm the absence of a nuclear warhead when ambiguities arise. So far, these measurements have sought to detect neutron emissions associated with the presence of plutonium, but they would be inadequate for uranium devices. In an effort to offer instruments that could be used to confirm the absence of both plutonium and uranium weapons, here we propose an inspection system that uses only passive gamma radiation detection techniques. Such a system would be particularly valuable for next-generation arms-control agreements that limit total numbers of weapons and would involve containerized items in storage. We conducted extensive Monte Carlo simulations to support the development of a verification protocol and detection algorithm. We demonstrate the viability of the technique using standard laboratory check sources and MCNP simulations for simplified configurations of special nuclear material.
AB - Arms-control agreements between the United States and Russia negotiated after the end of the Cold War have imposed limits on the number of deployed strategic nuclear weapons. Verification of these agreements has relied on onsite inspections, sometimes supported by radiation detection techniques to confirm the absence of a nuclear warhead when ambiguities arise. So far, these measurements have sought to detect neutron emissions associated with the presence of plutonium, but they would be inadequate for uranium devices. In an effort to offer instruments that could be used to confirm the absence of both plutonium and uranium weapons, here we propose an inspection system that uses only passive gamma radiation detection techniques. Such a system would be particularly valuable for next-generation arms-control agreements that limit total numbers of weapons and would involve containerized items in storage. We conducted extensive Monte Carlo simulations to support the development of a verification protocol and detection algorithm. We demonstrate the viability of the technique using standard laboratory check sources and MCNP simulations for simplified configurations of special nuclear material.
KW - Gamma spectroscopy
KW - Nuclear arms control and disarmament
KW - Nuclear verification
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U2 - 10.1016/j.nima.2020.164983
DO - 10.1016/j.nima.2020.164983
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85098856518
SN - 0168-9002
VL - 990
JO - Nuclear Instruments and Methods in Physics Research, Section A: Accelerators, Spectrometers, Detectors and Associated Equipment
JF - Nuclear Instruments and Methods in Physics Research, Section A: Accelerators, Spectrometers, Detectors and Associated Equipment
M1 - 164983
ER -