Competing for loyalty: The dynamics of rallying support

Matias Iaryczower, Santiago Oliveros

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

5 Scopus citations


We consider a class of dynamic collective action problems in which either a single principal or two competing principals vie for the support of members of a group. We focus on the dynamic problem that emerges when agents negotiate and commit their support to principals sequentially. We show that competition reduces agents' welfare with public goods, or if and only if there are positive externalities on uncommitted agents, and increases agents' welfare with public bads. We apply the model to the study of corporate takeovers, vote buying, and exclusive deals.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)2990-3005
Number of pages16
JournalAmerican Economic Review
Issue number10
StatePublished - Oct 2017

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics and Econometrics


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