Abstract
Endorsements are a simple language for communication between interest-group leaders and group members. The members, who share policy concerns, may not perfectly understand where their interests lie on certain issues. If their leaders cannot fully explain the issues, they can convey some information by endorsing a candidate or party. When interest groups endorse legislative contenders, the candidates may compete for backing. Policies may favor special interests at the expense of the general public. We examine the conditions under which parties compete for endorsements, the extent to which policy outcomes are skewed, and the normative properties of the political equilibria.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 501-524 |
Number of pages | 24 |
Journal | American Economic Review |
Volume | 89 |
Issue number | 3 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Jun 1999 |
Externally published | Yes |
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Economics and Econometrics