@article{abc02c433ae848058859766873a42187,
title = "Common belief foundations of global games",
abstract = "We study coordination games under general type spaces. We characterize rationalizable actions in terms of the properties of the belief hierarchies and show that there is a unique rationalizable action played whenever there is approximate common certainty of rank beliefs, defined as the probability the players assign to their payoff parameters being higher than their opponents'. We argue that this is the driving force behind selection results for the specific type spaces in the global games literature.",
keywords = "Global games, Higher-order beliefs, Rank beliefs, Rationalizability, Risk-dominance",
author = "Stephen Morris and Shin, {Hyun Song} and Muhamet Yildiz",
note = "Funding Information: This paper incorporates material from a working paper of the same title circulated in 2007 ( Morris and Shin, 2007 ). The first two authors are grateful to the National Science Foundation Grant SES-0648806 for funding this research. We are grateful for comments from editors, anonymous referees, and seminar participants at Columbia, Iowa State, Northwestern, and UCLA on this iteration of the project. We thank Anton Tsoy for detailed comments. The views expressed in this paper reflect those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Bank for International Settlements. Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2016 Elsevier Inc..",
year = "2016",
month = may,
day = "1",
doi = "10.1016/j.jet.2016.03.007",
language = "English (US)",
volume = "163",
pages = "826--848",
journal = "Journal of Economic Theory",
issn = "0022-0531",
publisher = "Academic Press Inc.",
}