TY - JOUR
T1 - Coming to Terms
T2 - The Politics of Sovereign Bond Denomination
AU - Ballard-Rosa, Cameron
AU - Mosley, Layna
AU - Wellhausen, Rachel L.
N1 - Funding Information:
Previous versions of this paper were presented at the 2018 International Political Economy Society meeting, the 2019 DebtCon meeting, the 2019 American Political Science Association meeting, New York University, Princeton University, and UC San Diego. We thank participants in those events, as well as B. Peter Rosendorff, Thomas Sattler, and two anonymous reviewers, for comments. Robert Galantucci and Mitch Watkins helped compile bond issue data; Devin Case-Ruchala and Bailee Donahue researched debt management practices; Kelly Kennedy and Benjamin Roberts helped compile credit rating and election data; and students at Innovations for Peace and Development at UT Austin researched case illustrations.
Publisher Copyright:
Copyright © The IO Foundation 2021.
PY - 2022/2/10
Y1 - 2022/2/10
N2 - Governments interact strategically with sovereign bond market creditors: they make choices not only about how often and how much to borrow, but also under what terms. The denomination of debt, in domestic or foreign currency, is a critical part of these terms. The original sin logic has long predicted that creditors have little appetite for developing-country government debt issued in domestic currency. Our novel data, including bond issues by 131 countries in 240,000 primary market transactions between 1990 and 2016, suggest otherwise. Domestic-denominated bonds have come to dominate the market, although domestic-currency issuance often is accompanied by shorter bond maturities. We argue that ideologically rooted policy preferences play an important role in this unexpected trend in denomination. All else equal, right governments choose foreign denomination as a means of mitigating currency risk and thus minimizing borrowing costs. In contrast, left governments opt for the flexibility of domestic denomination, and they are better able to act on their preferences in the presence of risk-mitigating monetary institutions and macroeconomic stability. We find support for our argument that partisanship has a robust and enduring relationship with denomination outcomes, even in a marketplace in which domestic-denominated developing-country sovereign bonds have become the norm.
AB - Governments interact strategically with sovereign bond market creditors: they make choices not only about how often and how much to borrow, but also under what terms. The denomination of debt, in domestic or foreign currency, is a critical part of these terms. The original sin logic has long predicted that creditors have little appetite for developing-country government debt issued in domestic currency. Our novel data, including bond issues by 131 countries in 240,000 primary market transactions between 1990 and 2016, suggest otherwise. Domestic-denominated bonds have come to dominate the market, although domestic-currency issuance often is accompanied by shorter bond maturities. We argue that ideologically rooted policy preferences play an important role in this unexpected trend in denomination. All else equal, right governments choose foreign denomination as a means of mitigating currency risk and thus minimizing borrowing costs. In contrast, left governments opt for the flexibility of domestic denomination, and they are better able to act on their preferences in the presence of risk-mitigating monetary institutions and macroeconomic stability. We find support for our argument that partisanship has a robust and enduring relationship with denomination outcomes, even in a marketplace in which domestic-denominated developing-country sovereign bonds have become the norm.
KW - bond terms
KW - currency
KW - denomination
KW - emerging markets
KW - partisanship
KW - Sovereign debt
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U2 - 10.1017/S0020818321000357
DO - 10.1017/S0020818321000357
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85112354755
SN - 0020-8183
VL - 76
SP - 32
EP - 69
JO - International Organization
JF - International Organization
IS - 1
ER -