Collective dynamic choice: The necessity of time inconsistency

Matthew O. Jackson, Leeat Yariv

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

48 Scopus citations

Abstract

We study collective decisions by time-discounting individuals choosing a common consumption stream. We show that with any heterogeneity in time preferences, every Pareto efficient and non-dictatorial method of aggregating utility functions must be time-inconsistent. We also show that decisions made via non-dictatorial voting methods are intransitive.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)150-178
Number of pages29
JournalAmerican Economic Journal: Microeconomics
Volume7
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - 2015
Externally publishedYes

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Collective dynamic choice: The necessity of time inconsistency'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this