TY - JOUR
T1 - Clearinghouses for two-sided matching
T2 - An experimental study
AU - Echenique, Federico
AU - Wilson, Alistair J.
AU - Yariv, Leeat
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
Copyright © 2016 Federico Echenique, Alistair J. Wilson, and Leeat Yariv
Copyright:
Copyright 2016 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.
PY - 2016/7/1
Y1 - 2016/7/1
N2 - We experimentally study the Gale and Shapley, 1962 mechanism, which is utilized in a wide set of applications, most prominently the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP). Several insights come out of our analysis. First, only 48% of our observed outcomes are stable, and among those a large majority culminate at the receiver-optimal stable matching. Second, receivers rarely truncate their true preferences: it is the proposers who do not make offers in order of their preference, frequently skipping potential partners. Third, market characteristics affect behavior: both the cardinal representation and core size influence whether laboratory outcomes are stable. We conclude by using our controlled results and a behavioral model to shed light on a number of stylized facts we derive from new NRMP survey and outcome data, and to explain the small cores previously documented for the NRMP.
AB - We experimentally study the Gale and Shapley, 1962 mechanism, which is utilized in a wide set of applications, most prominently the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP). Several insights come out of our analysis. First, only 48% of our observed outcomes are stable, and among those a large majority culminate at the receiver-optimal stable matching. Second, receivers rarely truncate their true preferences: it is the proposers who do not make offers in order of their preference, frequently skipping potential partners. Third, market characteristics affect behavior: both the cardinal representation and core size influence whether laboratory outcomes are stable. We conclude by using our controlled results and a behavioral model to shed light on a number of stylized facts we derive from new NRMP survey and outcome data, and to explain the small cores previously documented for the NRMP.
KW - Deferred acceptance
KW - centralized matching
KW - experiments
KW - stability
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84978710836&partnerID=8YFLogxK
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U2 - 10.3982/QE496
DO - 10.3982/QE496
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84978710836
VL - 7
SP - 449
EP - 482
JO - Quantitative Economics
JF - Quantitative Economics
SN - 1759-7323
IS - 2
ER -