Abstract
Causal refutations of external-world scepticism start from our ability to make justified judgements about the order of our own experiences, and end with the claim that there must be perceptible external objects, some of whose states can be causally correlated with that order. In a recent paper, I made a series of objections to this broadly Kantian anti-sceptical strategy. Georges Dicker has provided substantive replies on behalf of a version of the causal refutation of idealism. Here I offer a few final remarks about issues at the heart of our disagreement.
Original language | English (US) |
---|---|
Pages (from-to) | 184-186 |
Number of pages | 3 |
Journal | Philosophical Quarterly |
Volume | 61 |
Issue number | 242 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Jan 2011 |
Externally published | Yes |
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Philosophy