TY - JOUR
T1 - Causal-explanatory pluralism
T2 - How intentions, functions, and mechanisms influence causal ascriptions
AU - Lombrozo, Tania
N1 - Funding Information:
Sincere thanks to many people for relevant discussions, including John Campbell, Winston Chang, Fiery Cushman, Alison Gopnik, Tom Griffiths, Ned Hall, Chris Hitchcock, Joshua Knobe, Laurie Paul, Steven Sloman, Michael Strevens, Phil Wolff, and James Woodward, as well as the members of the Causation Collaborative funded by the McDonnell Foundation, the participants in the 2009 NEH workshop on Experimental Philosophy, and the members of the Concepts and Cognition lab at UC Berkeley. John Campbell, Winston Chang, Chris Hitchcock, Joshua Knobe, Laurie Paul, Steven Sloman, Phil Wolff, and James Woodward additionally provided helpful feedback on an earlier manuscript. Cleo Barrable, Christina Botros, Brian Christian, and Rosemary Jammal provided valuable input and helped tremendously with data collection. This work was supported by NSF Grant BCS-0819231.
PY - 2010/12
Y1 - 2010/12
N2 - Both philosophers and psychologists have argued for the existence of distinct kinds of explanations, including teleological explanations that cite functions or goals, and mechanistic explanations that cite causal mechanisms. Theories of causation, in contrast, have generally been unitary, with dominant theories focusing either on counterfactual dependence or on physical connections. This paper argues that both approaches to causation are psychologically real, with different modes of explanation promoting judgments more or less consistent with each approach. Two sets of experiments isolate the contributions of counterfactual dependence and physical connections in causal ascriptions involving events with people, artifacts, or biological traits, and manipulate whether the events are construed teleologically or mechanistically. The findings suggest that when events are construed teleologically, causal ascriptions are sensitive to counterfactual dependence and relatively insensitive to the presence of physical connections, but when events are construed mechanistically, causal ascriptions are sensitive to both counterfactual dependence and physical connections. The conclusion introduces an account of causation, an " exportable dependence theory," that provides a way to understand the contributions of physical connections and teleology in terms of the functions of causal ascriptions.
AB - Both philosophers and psychologists have argued for the existence of distinct kinds of explanations, including teleological explanations that cite functions or goals, and mechanistic explanations that cite causal mechanisms. Theories of causation, in contrast, have generally been unitary, with dominant theories focusing either on counterfactual dependence or on physical connections. This paper argues that both approaches to causation are psychologically real, with different modes of explanation promoting judgments more or less consistent with each approach. Two sets of experiments isolate the contributions of counterfactual dependence and physical connections in causal ascriptions involving events with people, artifacts, or biological traits, and manipulate whether the events are construed teleologically or mechanistically. The findings suggest that when events are construed teleologically, causal ascriptions are sensitive to counterfactual dependence and relatively insensitive to the presence of physical connections, but when events are construed mechanistically, causal ascriptions are sensitive to both counterfactual dependence and physical connections. The conclusion introduces an account of causation, an " exportable dependence theory," that provides a way to understand the contributions of physical connections and teleology in terms of the functions of causal ascriptions.
KW - Causal mechanism
KW - Causation
KW - Counterfactual dependence
KW - Double prevention
KW - Explanation
KW - Functional explanation
KW - Functions
KW - Intentions
KW - Late preemption
KW - Teleological explanation
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U2 - 10.1016/j.cogpsych.2010.05.002
DO - 10.1016/j.cogpsych.2010.05.002
M3 - Article
C2 - 20801434
AN - SCOPUS:78149470649
SN - 0010-0285
VL - 61
SP - 303
EP - 332
JO - Cognitive Psychology
JF - Cognitive Psychology
IS - 4
ER -