@article{e2a4bf89456044dea6452f5614dbba56,
title = "Catalytic finance: When does it work?",
abstract = "In a model of debt crisis caused partly by creditor coordination failure, we show that bailouts that reduce ex post inefficiency will sometimes enhance the incentives for governments to take costly adjustment effort. This model helps us understand a debate about the role of the IMF in catalyzing lending to developing countries.",
keywords = "Catalytic finance, Debtor adjustment, IMF, Moral hazard, Sovereign debt",
author = "Stephen Morris and Shin, {Hyun Song}",
note = "Funding Information: We thank the co-editor Eric van Wincoop and two anonymous referees for their guidance. We also thank Andy Haldane, Catherine Hovaguimian, Silvia Marchesi, Adrian Penalver, and Vicky Saporta for comments on earlier drafts. We have gained from feedback from participants at the UT Austin/Dallas Fed conference “Sovereign Debt in the 21st Century”, and seminar participants at the IMF, New York Fed and Bank of England. Morris gratefully acknowledges many valuable conversations while a visitor at the IMF research department in March 2002. Shin acknowledges support from the U.K. ESRC under grant 156-25-0026. The views expressed are those of the authors alone.",
year = "2006",
month = sep,
doi = "10.1016/j.jinteco.2005.06.014",
language = "English (US)",
volume = "70",
pages = "161--177",
journal = "Journal of International Economics",
issn = "0022-1996",
publisher = "Elsevier",
number = "1",
}