Catalytic finance: When does it work?

Stephen Morris, Hyun Song Shin

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

63 Scopus citations

Abstract

In a model of debt crisis caused partly by creditor coordination failure, we show that bailouts that reduce ex post inefficiency will sometimes enhance the incentives for governments to take costly adjustment effort. This model helps us understand a debate about the role of the IMF in catalyzing lending to developing countries.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)161-177
Number of pages17
JournalJournal of International Economics
Volume70
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Sep 1 2006

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

Keywords

  • Catalytic finance
  • Debtor adjustment
  • IMF
  • Moral hazard
  • Sovereign debt

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Catalytic finance: When does it work?'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

  • Cite this