Abstract
It is rather discouraging that forty years have passed since Frederic Fitch first propounded his paradox of knowability without philosophers having achieved agreement on a solution. As a general rule, when modal phenomena prove puzzling, it is a good idea to look at the corresponding temporal phenomena. This chapter examines not the knowability principle that whatever is true can be known, but rather the discovery principle that whatever is true will be known.
Original language | English (US) |
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Title of host publication | New Essays on the Knowability Paradox |
Publisher | Oxford University Press |
ISBN (Electronic) | 9780191713972 |
ISBN (Print) | 9780199285495 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Sep 1 2010 |
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- General Arts and Humanities
Keywords
- Discovery
- Fitch paradox
- Knowability paradox
- Truth