TY - JOUR
T1 - Can Science Explain the Human Mind? Intuitive Judgments About the Limits of Science
AU - Gottlieb, Sara
AU - Lombrozo, Tania
N1 - Funding Information:
We thank the James S. McDonnell Foundation and the John Templeton Foundation for support.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2017, © The Author(s) 2017.
PY - 2018/1/1
Y1 - 2018/1/1
N2 - Can science explain romantic love, morality, and religious belief? We documented intuitive beliefs about the limits of science in explaining the human mind. We considered both epistemic evaluations (concerning whether science could possibly fully explain a given psychological phenomenon) and nonepistemic judgments (concerning whether scientific explanations for a given phenomenon would generate discomfort), and we identified factors that characterize phenomena judged to fall beyond the scope of science. Across six studies, we found that participants were more likely to judge scientific explanations for psychological phenomena to be impossible and uncomfortable when, among other factors, they support first-person, introspective access (e.g., feeling empathetic as opposed to reaching for objects), contribute to making humans exceptional (e.g., appreciating music as opposed to forgetfulness), and involve conscious will (e.g., acting immorally as opposed to having headaches). These judgments about the scope of science have implications for science education, policy, and the public reception of psychological science.
AB - Can science explain romantic love, morality, and religious belief? We documented intuitive beliefs about the limits of science in explaining the human mind. We considered both epistemic evaluations (concerning whether science could possibly fully explain a given psychological phenomenon) and nonepistemic judgments (concerning whether scientific explanations for a given phenomenon would generate discomfort), and we identified factors that characterize phenomena judged to fall beyond the scope of science. Across six studies, we found that participants were more likely to judge scientific explanations for psychological phenomena to be impossible and uncomfortable when, among other factors, they support first-person, introspective access (e.g., feeling empathetic as opposed to reaching for objects), contribute to making humans exceptional (e.g., appreciating music as opposed to forgetfulness), and involve conscious will (e.g., acting immorally as opposed to having headaches). These judgments about the scope of science have implications for science education, policy, and the public reception of psychological science.
KW - explanation
KW - folk epistemology
KW - mind-body dualism
KW - open data
KW - open materials
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U2 - 10.1177/0956797617722609
DO - 10.1177/0956797617722609
M3 - Article
C2 - 29095658
AN - SCOPUS:85040747234
SN - 0956-7976
VL - 29
SP - 121
EP - 130
JO - Psychological Science
JF - Psychological Science
IS - 1
ER -