TY - GEN

T1 - Bitcoin

T2 - 10th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science, ITCS 2019

AU - Arnosti, Nick

AU - Matthew Weinberg, S.

PY - 2019/1/1

Y1 - 2019/1/1

N2 - Although Bitcoin was intended to be a decentralized digital currency, in practice, mining power is quite concentrated. This fact is a persistent source of concern for the Bitcoin community. We provide an explanation using a simple model to capture miners’ incentives to invest in equipment. In our model, n miners compete for a prize of fixed size. Each miner chooses an investment qi, incurring cost ciqi, and then receives reward (Formula presented.), for some α ≥ 1. When ci = cj for all i, j, and α = 1, there is a unique equilibrium where all miners invest equally. However, we prove that under seemingly mild deviations from this model, equilibrium outcomes become drastically more centralized. In particular, ▬ When costs are asymmetric, if miner i chooses to invest, then miner j has market share at least (Formula presented.). That is, if miner j has costs that are (e.g.) 20% lower than those of miner i, then miner j must control at least 20% of the total mining power. ▬ In the presence of economies of scale (α > 1), every market participant has a market share of at least (Formula presented.), implying that the market features at most (Formula presented.) miners in total. We discuss the implications of our results for the future design of cryptocurrencies. In particular, our work further motivates the study of protocols that minimize “orphaned” blocks, proof-of-stake protocols, and incentive compatible protocols.

AB - Although Bitcoin was intended to be a decentralized digital currency, in practice, mining power is quite concentrated. This fact is a persistent source of concern for the Bitcoin community. We provide an explanation using a simple model to capture miners’ incentives to invest in equipment. In our model, n miners compete for a prize of fixed size. Each miner chooses an investment qi, incurring cost ciqi, and then receives reward (Formula presented.), for some α ≥ 1. When ci = cj for all i, j, and α = 1, there is a unique equilibrium where all miners invest equally. However, we prove that under seemingly mild deviations from this model, equilibrium outcomes become drastically more centralized. In particular, ▬ When costs are asymmetric, if miner i chooses to invest, then miner j has market share at least (Formula presented.). That is, if miner j has costs that are (e.g.) 20% lower than those of miner i, then miner j must control at least 20% of the total mining power. ▬ In the presence of economies of scale (α > 1), every market participant has a market share of at least (Formula presented.), implying that the market features at most (Formula presented.) miners in total. We discuss the implications of our results for the future design of cryptocurrencies. In particular, our work further motivates the study of protocols that minimize “orphaned” blocks, proof-of-stake protocols, and incentive compatible protocols.

KW - Bitcoin

KW - Cryptocurrencies

KW - Rent-seeking competition

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85069533851&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85069533851&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2019.5

DO - 10.4230/LIPIcs.ITCS.2019.5

M3 - Conference contribution

AN - SCOPUS:85069533851

T3 - Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics, LIPIcs

BT - 10th Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science, ITCS 2019

A2 - Blum, Avrim

PB - Schloss Dagstuhl- Leibniz-Zentrum fur Informatik GmbH, Dagstuhl Publishing

Y2 - 10 January 2019 through 12 January 2019

ER -