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Bid shading and bidder surplus in the US treasury auction system
Ali Hortaçsu
,
Jakub Kastl
, Allen Zhang
Economics
Bendheim Center for Finance
Research output
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Contribution to journal
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Article
›
peer-review
41
Scopus citations
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Dive into the research topics of 'Bid shading and bidder surplus in the US treasury auction system'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.
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Keyphrases
Auction System
100%
Bid Shading
100%
Bidders
100%
Bidding Data
25%
Bidding System
25%
Effciency
25%
Informational Asymmetry
25%
Price Bids
25%
Primary Dealers
50%
Treasury Auctions
100%
Treasury Bills
25%
Treasury Notes
25%
U.S. Treasury
100%
Uniform Price Auction
25%
Willingness to Pay
25%
Economics, Econometrics and Finance
Bid Price
50%
Government Securities
50%
Willingness to Pay
50%