Abstract
Because they represent different kinds of constituencies - states versus parts of states - senators and House members have different incentives in constructing federal distributive programs. In order to claim credit for providing particularized benefits, House members need to use policy tools - earmarks and narrow categorical programs - that target funds to their constituencies. Senators, by contrast, are able to claim credit for the large formula grants that distribute the bulk of intergovernmental grant money. Examining House-Senate interactions in one of the largest distributive programs, federal aid to states for surface transportation, I show that the different bases of representation in the House and Senate structure the chambers' preferences on distributive programs and affect the outcomes of interchamber conflicts.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 185-213 |
Number of pages | 29 |
Journal | Legislative Studies Quarterly |
Volume | 29 |
Issue number | 2 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - 2004 |
Externally published | Yes |
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Sociology and Political Science