Biased Policy Professionals

Sheheryar Banuri, Stefan Dercon, Varun Gauri

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

29 Scopus citations

Abstract

Although the decisions of policy professionals are often more consequential than those of individuals in their private capacity, there is a dearth of studies on the biases of policy professionals: those who prepare and implement policy on behalf of elected politicians. Experiments conducted on a novel subject pool of development policy professionals (public servants of the World Bank and the Department for International Development in the UK) show that policy professionals are indeed subject to decision-making traps, including the effects of framing outcomes as losses or gains, and, most strikingly, confirmation bias driven by ideological predisposition, despite having an explicit mission to promote evidence-informed and impartial decision making. These findings should worry policy professionals and their principals in governments and large organizations, as well as citizens themselves. A further experiment, in which policy professionals engage in discussion, shows that deliberation may be able to mitigate the effects of some of these biases.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Article numberlhy033
Pages (from-to)310-327
Number of pages18
JournalWorld Bank Economic Review
Volume33
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Jun 1 2019
Externally publishedYes

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Accounting
  • Development
  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

Keywords

  • behavioral economics
  • biases
  • confirmation bias
  • decision making
  • framing
  • policy professionals

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