Bias and Disagreement

We often persist in holding controversial views while knowing that there are people on the other side of the issue who seem just as well qualified as we are to make an accurate judgment about the issue. Even more suspiciously, we often persist in holding controversial views while knowing that there are people on the other side of the issue who seem better qualified than we are to make an accurate judgment. Is there any chance that our doing such things is rationally defensible? This chapter zeros in on a tactic that is frequently employed by believers in such contexts: that of attributing bias or potential bias in order to minimize the epistemic significance of disagreement. Often, we discount someone’s opinion on the grounds that they are biased, or because there is a significant chance that they are, or because the possibility of bias is salient and we are not in a position to rule it out. Undoubtedly, one thing that makes attributions of bias so popular is their potential power: when it comes to evaluating someone’s overall credibility with respect to an issue, their scoring poorly on “the bias dimension” tends to trump or neutralize their scoring well with respect to other salient dimensions (e.g., their possession of credentials characteristic of an expert). What norms govern the practice of attributing bias in such contexts? A number of pitfalls for the practice are explored, and the consequences for the epistemology of disagreement are assessed.