Best response equivalence

Stephen Morris, Takashi Ui

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

33 Scopus citations


Two games are best-response equivalent if they have the same best-response correspondence. We provide a characterization of when two games are best-response equivalent. The characterizations exploit a dual relationship between payoff differences and beliefs. Some "potential game" arguments [Games Econ. Behav. 14 (1996) 124] rely only on the property that potential games are best-response equivalent to identical interest games. Our results show that a large class of games are best-response equivalent to identical interest games, but are not potential games. Thus we show how some existing potential game arguments can be extended.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)260-287
Number of pages28
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Issue number2
StatePublished - Nov 2004

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics


  • Best response equivalence
  • Duality
  • Farkas' Lemma
  • Potential games


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