Abstract
Two games are best-response equivalent if they have the same best-response correspondence. We provide a characterization of when two games are best-response equivalent. The characterizations exploit a dual relationship between payoff differences and beliefs. Some "potential game" arguments [Games Econ. Behav. 14 (1996) 124] rely only on the property that potential games are best-response equivalent to identical interest games. Our results show that a large class of games are best-response equivalent to identical interest games, but are not potential games. Thus we show how some existing potential game arguments can be extended.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 260-287 |
Number of pages | 28 |
Journal | Games and Economic Behavior |
Volume | 49 |
Issue number | 2 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Nov 2004 |
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Finance
- Economics and Econometrics
Keywords
- Best response equivalence
- Duality
- Farkas' Lemma
- Potential games