Two non-bayesian approaches to belief fixation have been explored in recent years. On the one hand, the theory of belief revision has been stimulated by the AGM tradition and its successors. On the other hand, the theory of scientific inquiry has made progress clarifying the mathematics of reliable discovery. In the present paper we discuss the relation between the two approaches. In particular, we consider whether they allow scientific inquiry to be represented as a process of rational hypothesis selection in the face of data. The present paper overviews a theory developed in detail in [E. Martin and D. Osherson. Scientific discovery based on belief revision. Journal of Symbolic Logic, in press., E. Martin and D. Osherson. Elements of scientific inquiry, MIT Press, Cambridge MA, 1998.]. The exposition is designed to be of interest to researchers in diverse fields.
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Sociology and Political Science
- Social Sciences(all)
- Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty