Belief, credence, and norms

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Abstract

There are currently two robust traditions in philosophy dealing with doxastic attitudes: the tradition that is concerned primarily with all-or-nothing belief, and the tradition that is concerned primarily with degree of belief or credence. This paper concerns the relationship between belief and credence for a rational agent, and is directed at those who may have hoped that the notion of belief can either be reduced to credence or eliminated altogether when characterizing the norms governing ideally rational agents. It presents a puzzle which lends support to two theses. First, that there is no formal reduction of a rational agent's beliefs to her credences, because belief and credence are each responsive to different features of a body of evidence. Second, that if our traditional understanding of our practices of holding each other responsible is correct, then belief has a distinctive role to play, even for ideally rational agents, that cannot be played by credence. The question of which avenues remain for the credence-only theorist is considered.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)285-311
Number of pages27
JournalPhilosophical Studies
Volume169
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Jun 2014
Externally publishedYes

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Philosophy

Keywords

  • Belief
  • Credence
  • Lockean view
  • Probability
  • Reactive attitudes
  • Statistical evidence

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