TY - JOUR
T1 - Belief Convergence under Misspecified Learning
T2 - A Martingale Approach
AU - Frick, Mira
AU - Iijima, Ryota
AU - Ishii, Yuhta
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© The Author(s) 2022. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Review of Economic Studies Limited.
PY - 2023/3/1
Y1 - 2023/3/1
N2 - We present an approach to analyse learning outcomes in a broad class of misspecified environments, spanning both single-agent and social learning. We introduce a novel “prediction accuracy” order over subjective models and observe that this makes it possible to partially restore standard martingale convergence arguments that apply under correctly specified learning. Based on this, we derive general conditions to determine when beliefs in a given environment converge to some long-run belief either locally or globally (i.e. from some or all initial beliefs). We show that these conditions can be applied, first, to unify and generalize various convergence results in previously studied settings. Second, they enable us to analyse environments where learning is “slow”, such as costly information acquisition and sequential social learning. In such environments, we illustrate that even if agents learn the truth when they are correctly specified, vanishingly small amounts of misspecification can generate extreme failures of learning.
AB - We present an approach to analyse learning outcomes in a broad class of misspecified environments, spanning both single-agent and social learning. We introduce a novel “prediction accuracy” order over subjective models and observe that this makes it possible to partially restore standard martingale convergence arguments that apply under correctly specified learning. Based on this, we derive general conditions to determine when beliefs in a given environment converge to some long-run belief either locally or globally (i.e. from some or all initial beliefs). We show that these conditions can be applied, first, to unify and generalize various convergence results in previously studied settings. Second, they enable us to analyse environments where learning is “slow”, such as costly information acquisition and sequential social learning. In such environments, we illustrate that even if agents learn the truth when they are correctly specified, vanishingly small amounts of misspecification can generate extreme failures of learning.
KW - Belief convergence
KW - Berk–Nash equilibrium
KW - Misspecified learning
KW - Slow learning
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/85171991696
UR - https://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85171991696&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1093/restud/rdac040
DO - 10.1093/restud/rdac040
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85171991696
SN - 0034-6527
VL - 90
SP - 781
EP - 814
JO - Review of Economic Studies
JF - Review of Economic Studies
IS - 2
ER -