Backgrounding Desire

Philip Pettit; Michael Smith

doi:10.1093/oso/9780199253364.003.0014

Backgrounding Desire

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Chapter

Abstract

Granted that desire is always present in the genesis of human action, is it something on the presence of which the agent always reflects? I may act on a belief without coming to recognize that I have the belief. Can I act on a desire without recognizing that I have the desire? In particular, can the desire have a motivational presence in my decision00ADmaking, figuring in the background, as it were, without appearing in the content of my deliberation, in the foreground?.

Original language	English (US)
Title of host publication	Mind, Morality, and Explanation
Subtitle of host publication	Selected Collaborations
Publisher	Oxford University Press
Pages	269-294
Number of pages	26
ISBN (Electronic)	9781383039337
ISBN (Print)	9780199253364
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199253364.003.0014
State	Published - Jan 1 2024

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

General Arts and Humanities

Keywords

background
Granted
motivational
recognizing
unsurprisingly

Access to Document

10.1093/oso/9780199253364.003.0014

Cite this

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KW - unsurprisingly

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Backgrounding Desire

Abstract

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Keywords

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