Auction-based resource allocation for cooperative communications

Jianwei Huang, Zhu Han, Mung Chiang, H. Vincent Poor

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

222 Scopus citations

Abstract

Distributed and efficient resource allocation is critical for fully realizing the benefits of cooperative communications in large scale communication networks. This paper proposes two auction mechanisms, the SNR auction and the power auction, that determine relay selection and relay power allocation in a distributed fashion. A single-relay network is considered first, and the existence and uniqueness of the Nash Equilibrium (i.e., the auction's outcome) are proved. It is shown that the power auction achieves the efficient allocation by maximizing the total rate increase, and the SNR auction is flexible in trading off fairness and efficiency. For both auctions, the distributed best response bid updates globally converge to the unique Nash Equilibrium in a completely asynchronous manner. The analysis is then generalized to networks with multiple relays, and the existence of the Nash Equilibrium is shown under appropriate conditions. Simulation results verify the effectiveness and robustness of the proposed algorithms.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Article number4604747
Pages (from-to)1226-1237
Number of pages12
JournalIEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Volume26
Issue number7
DOIs
StatePublished - Sep 1 2008

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Computer Networks and Communications
  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering

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