TY - JOUR
T1 - Attention control and the attention schema theory of consciousness
AU - Wilterson, Andrew I.
AU - Kemper, Casey M.
AU - Kim, Noah
AU - Webb, Taylor W.
AU - Reblando, Alexandra M.W.
AU - Graziano, Michael S.A.
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2020 The Author(s)
PY - 2020/12
Y1 - 2020/12
N2 - In the attention schema theory (AST), the brain constructs a schematic, simplified model of attention. The model is associated with three cognitive processes: a model of one's own attention contributes to the endogenous control of attention, a model of the attention of others contributes to theory of mind, and the contents of these models leads to the common human claim that we contain a non-physical consciousness or awareness inside us. Because AST is a control-engineering style theory, it can make specific predictions in complex situations. Here, over six experiments, we examined interactions between attention and awareness to test predictions of AST. Participants performed a visual task in which a cue stimulus affected their attention, as measured by their reactions to a subsequent target stimulus. The task measured both exogenous attention drawn to the cue and endogenous attention directed to a target location predicted by the cue. When participants were not aware that the cue predicted the target, both exogenous and endogenous attention effects remained. In contrast, when participants were not visually aware of the cue itself, the exogenous attention effect remained and the endogenous effect was impaired. In an additional two experiments, when participants learned an implicit shift of attention, the learning generalized from trained spatial locations to adjacent, untrained locations. Each of these findings matched predictions of AST. The results support the interpretation that attention control relies partly on an internal model that is responsible for claims of awareness.
AB - In the attention schema theory (AST), the brain constructs a schematic, simplified model of attention. The model is associated with three cognitive processes: a model of one's own attention contributes to the endogenous control of attention, a model of the attention of others contributes to theory of mind, and the contents of these models leads to the common human claim that we contain a non-physical consciousness or awareness inside us. Because AST is a control-engineering style theory, it can make specific predictions in complex situations. Here, over six experiments, we examined interactions between attention and awareness to test predictions of AST. Participants performed a visual task in which a cue stimulus affected their attention, as measured by their reactions to a subsequent target stimulus. The task measured both exogenous attention drawn to the cue and endogenous attention directed to a target location predicted by the cue. When participants were not aware that the cue predicted the target, both exogenous and endogenous attention effects remained. In contrast, when participants were not visually aware of the cue itself, the exogenous attention effect remained and the endogenous effect was impaired. In an additional two experiments, when participants learned an implicit shift of attention, the learning generalized from trained spatial locations to adjacent, untrained locations. Each of these findings matched predictions of AST. The results support the interpretation that attention control relies partly on an internal model that is responsible for claims of awareness.
KW - Awareness
KW - Consciousness
KW - Endogenous attention
KW - Exogenous attention
KW - Internal model
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U2 - 10.1016/j.pneurobio.2020.101844
DO - 10.1016/j.pneurobio.2020.101844
M3 - Article
C2 - 32497564
AN - SCOPUS:85085930653
SN - 0301-0082
VL - 195
JO - Progress in Neurobiology
JF - Progress in Neurobiology
M1 - 101844
ER -