Abstract
A spatial model of elections with campaign contributions is constructed in which contributors give money to help the candidates they like get elected. It is shown how candidate-specific policy effects on firms cause candidates to adopt different policy positions. It is also shown how the additional presence of firm-specific policy effects may cause polarization of candidate policy positions. A comparative statics analysis establishes relationship among several key parameters of the model. Even though contributors take candidate positions as given, anticipatory position-taking by the candidates causes contributors to exert a powerful influence over candidate behavior.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 117-132 |
| Number of pages | 16 |
| Journal | Mathematical and Computer Modelling |
| Volume | 16 |
| Issue number | 8-9 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - 1992 |
| Externally published | Yes |
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Modeling and Simulation
- Computer Science Applications