TY - JOUR
T1 - Approximative Threshold Optimization From Single Antenna to Massive SIMO Authentication
AU - Roth, Stefan
AU - Sezgin, Aydin
AU - Bessel, Roman
AU - Poor, H. Vincent
N1 - Funding Information:
This work was supported in part by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG, German Research Foundation) under Germany’s Excellence Strategy - EXC 2092 CASA under Grant 390781972 and in part by the U.S. National Science Foundation under Grant CCF-1908308
Publisher Copyright:
© 2020 IEEE.
PY - 2023
Y1 - 2023
N2 - In a wireless sensor network, data from various sensors are gathered to estimate the system-state of a process system. However, adversaries aim at distorting the estimation, for which they may infiltrate sensors or position additional devices in the environment. For authentication, the receiver can evaluate the integrity of measurements from different sensors jointly with the temporal integrity of channel measurements from each sensor. Therefore, we design a security protocol, in which Kalman filters predict the system-state and the channel-state values. Then, the received data is authenticated by a hypothesis test. We theoretically analyze the adversarial success probability and the reliability in two ways, based on chi-square and Gaussian approximations. The two approximations are exact for small and large data vectors, respectively. Hence, the Gaussian approximation is suitable for analyzing massive single-input multiple-output (SIMO) setups. This approximation is adapted to channel hardening, which occurs in massive SIMO fading channels. As adversaries always look for the weakest point, a time-independent security level is required. Hence, the approximations are used to propose time-varying thresholds for the hypothesis test, which approximately attain a constant security level. Numerical results show that either the security level or the threshold value can be time-independent, but not both.
AB - In a wireless sensor network, data from various sensors are gathered to estimate the system-state of a process system. However, adversaries aim at distorting the estimation, for which they may infiltrate sensors or position additional devices in the environment. For authentication, the receiver can evaluate the integrity of measurements from different sensors jointly with the temporal integrity of channel measurements from each sensor. Therefore, we design a security protocol, in which Kalman filters predict the system-state and the channel-state values. Then, the received data is authenticated by a hypothesis test. We theoretically analyze the adversarial success probability and the reliability in two ways, based on chi-square and Gaussian approximations. The two approximations are exact for small and large data vectors, respectively. Hence, the Gaussian approximation is suitable for analyzing massive single-input multiple-output (SIMO) setups. This approximation is adapted to channel hardening, which occurs in massive SIMO fading channels. As adversaries always look for the weakest point, a time-independent security level is required. Hence, the approximations are used to propose time-varying thresholds for the hypothesis test, which approximately attain a constant security level. Numerical results show that either the security level or the threshold value can be time-independent, but not both.
KW - Kalman filter
KW - Physical layer security
KW - authentication
KW - hypothesis testing
KW - massive SIMO
KW - process monitoring
KW - wireless sensor networks
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U2 - 10.1109/OJVT.2022.3229064
DO - 10.1109/OJVT.2022.3229064
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85144754759
SN - 2644-1330
VL - 4
SP - 193
EP - 207
JO - IEEE Open Journal of Vehicular Technology
JF - IEEE Open Journal of Vehicular Technology
ER -