Approximate common knowledge revisited

Stephen Morris

Research output: Contribution to journalReview article

16 Scopus citations

Abstract

Suppose we replace "knowledge" by "belief with probability p" in standard definitions of common knowledge. Very different notions arise depending on the exact definition of common knowledge used in the substitution. This paper demonstrates those differences and identifies which notion is relevant in each of three contexts: equilibrium analysis in incomplete information games, best response dynamics in incomplete information games, and agreeing to disagree/no trade results.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)385-408
Number of pages24
JournalInternational Journal of Game Theory
Volume28
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - Aug 1999

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Statistics and Probability
  • Mathematics (miscellaneous)
  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty

Keywords

  • Agreeing to disagree
  • Common knowledge

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