Approximate common knowledge revisited

Stephen Morris

doi:10.1007/s001820050116

Approximate common knowledge revisited

Stephen Morris

Research output: Contribution to journal › Review article › peer-review

19 Scopus citations

Abstract

Suppose we replace "knowledge" by "belief with probability p" in standard definitions of common knowledge. Very different notions arise depending on the exact definition of common knowledge used in the substitution. This paper demonstrates those differences and identifies which notion is relevant in each of three contexts: equilibrium analysis in incomplete information games, best response dynamics in incomplete information games, and agreeing to disagree/no trade results.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	385-408
Number of pages	24
Journal	International Journal of Game Theory
Volume	28
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820050116
State	Published - Aug 1999

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Statistics and Probability
Mathematics (miscellaneous)
Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
Economics and Econometrics
Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty

Keywords

Agreeing to disagree
Common knowledge

Access to Document

10.1007/s001820050116

Cite this

@article{55d4a5afa688436bb9de4e4d7556b361,

title = "Approximate common knowledge revisited",

abstract = "Suppose we replace {"}knowledge{"} by {"}belief with probability p{"} in standard definitions of common knowledge. Very different notions arise depending on the exact definition of common knowledge used in the substitution. This paper demonstrates those differences and identifies which notion is relevant in each of three contexts: equilibrium analysis in incomplete information games, best response dynamics in incomplete information games, and agreeing to disagree/no trade results.",

keywords = "Agreeing to disagree, Common knowledge",

author = "Stephen Morris",

year = "1999",

month = aug,

doi = "10.1007/s001820050116",

language = "English (US)",

volume = "28",

pages = "385--408",

journal = "International Journal of Game Theory",

issn = "0020-7276",

publisher = "Springer Verlag",

number = "3",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Approximate common knowledge revisited

AU - Morris, Stephen

PY - 1999/8

Y1 - 1999/8

N2 - Suppose we replace "knowledge" by "belief with probability p" in standard definitions of common knowledge. Very different notions arise depending on the exact definition of common knowledge used in the substitution. This paper demonstrates those differences and identifies which notion is relevant in each of three contexts: equilibrium analysis in incomplete information games, best response dynamics in incomplete information games, and agreeing to disagree/no trade results.

AB - Suppose we replace "knowledge" by "belief with probability p" in standard definitions of common knowledge. Very different notions arise depending on the exact definition of common knowledge used in the substitution. This paper demonstrates those differences and identifies which notion is relevant in each of three contexts: equilibrium analysis in incomplete information games, best response dynamics in incomplete information games, and agreeing to disagree/no trade results.

KW - Agreeing to disagree

KW - Common knowledge

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=0033409262&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=0033409262&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1007/s001820050116

DO - 10.1007/s001820050116

M3 - Review article

AN - SCOPUS:0033409262

SN - 0020-7276

VL - 28

SP - 385

EP - 408

JO - International Journal of Game Theory

JF - International Journal of Game Theory

IS - 3

ER -

Approximate common knowledge revisited

Abstract

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Keywords

Access to Document

Other files and links

Fingerprint

Cite this