Abstract
Suppose we replace "knowledge" by "belief with probability p" in standard definitions of common knowledge. Very different notions arise depending on the exact definition of common knowledge used in the substitution. This paper demonstrates those differences and identifies which notion is relevant in each of three contexts: equilibrium analysis in incomplete information games, best response dynamics in incomplete information games, and agreeing to disagree/no trade results.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 385-408 |
Number of pages | 24 |
Journal | International Journal of Game Theory |
Volume | 28 |
Issue number | 3 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Aug 1999 |
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Statistics and Probability
- Mathematics (miscellaneous)
- Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
- Economics and Econometrics
- Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty
Keywords
- Agreeing to disagree
- Common knowledge