Approximate common knowledge and co-ordination: Recent lessons from game theory

Stephen Morris, Hyun Song Shin

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

43 Scopus citations


The importance of the notion of common knowledge in sustaining cooperative outcomes in strategic situations is well appreciated. However, the systematic analysis of the extent to which small departures from common knowledge affect equilibrium in games has only recently been attempted. We review the main themes in this literature, in particular, the notion of common p-belief. We utline both the analytical issues raised, and the potential applicability of such ideas to game theory, computer science and the philosophy of language.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)171-190
Number of pages20
JournalJournal of Logic, Language and Information
Issue number2
StatePublished - 1997

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Computer Science (miscellaneous)
  • Philosophy
  • Linguistics and Language


  • Common belief
  • Common knowledge
  • Coordination
  • Game theory
  • Language
  • Protocols


Dive into the research topics of 'Approximate common knowledge and co-ordination: Recent lessons from game theory'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this