12 Scopus citations

Abstract

Anonymity systems like Tor are known to be vulnerable to malicious relay nodes. Another serious threat comes from the Autonomous Systems (ASes) that carry Tor traffic due to their powerful eavesdropping capabilities. Indeed, an AS (or set of colluding ASes) that lies between the client and the first relay, and between the last relay and the destination, can perform timing analysis to compromise user anonymity. In this paper, we show that AS-level adversaries are much more powerful than previously thought. First, routine BGP routing changes can significantly increase the number of ASes that can analyze a user's traffic successfully. Second, ASes can actively manipulate BGP announcements to put themselves on the paths to and from relay nodes. Third, an AS can perform timing analysis even when it sees only one direction of the traffic at both communication ends. Actually, asymmetric routing increases the fraction of ASes able to analyze a user's traffic. We present a preliminary evaluation of our attacks using measurements of BGP and Tor. Our findings motivate the design of approaches for anonymous communication that are resilient to AS-level adversaries.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationProceedings of the 13th ACM Workshop on Hot Topics in Networks, HotNets 2014
PublisherAssociation for Computing Machinery, Inc
ISBN (Electronic)9781450332569
DOIs
StatePublished - Oct 27 2014
Event13th ACM SIGCOMM Workshop on Hot Topics in Networks, HotNets 2014 - Los Angeles, United States
Duration: Oct 27 2014Oct 28 2014

Publication series

NameProceedings of the 13th ACM Workshop on Hot Topics in Networks, HotNets 2014

Other

Other13th ACM SIGCOMM Workshop on Hot Topics in Networks, HotNets 2014
CountryUnited States
CityLos Angeles
Period10/27/1410/28/14

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

  • Computer Networks and Communications

Keywords

  • Anonymity system
  • BGP
  • IP hijack
  • MITM
  • Man-in-the-middle
  • Routing dynamic
  • Tor

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    Vanbever, L., Li, O., Rexford, J. L., & Mittal, P. (2014). Anonymity on QuickSand: Using BGP to compromise tor. In Proceedings of the 13th ACM Workshop on Hot Topics in Networks, HotNets 2014 [2673869] (Proceedings of the 13th ACM Workshop on Hot Topics in Networks, HotNets 2014). Association for Computing Machinery, Inc. https://doi.org/10.1145/2670518.2673869