Abstract
This essay provides an introduction to our recent work on robust mechanism design. The objective is to provide an overview of the research agenda and its results. We present the main results and illustrate many of them in terms of a common and canonical example, the single unit auction with interdependent values. In addition, we provide an extended discussion about the role of alternative assumptions about type spaces in our work, and the literature at large, in order to explain the common logic of the informational robustness approach that unifies the work.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 169-230 |
| Number of pages | 62 |
| Journal | Foundations and Trends in Microeconomics |
| Volume | 8 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - 2012 |
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Economics and Econometrics
Keywords
- Common knowledge
- Dominant strategies
- Ex post equilibrium
- Full implementation
- Interim equilibrium
- Mechanism design
- Partial implementation
- Rationalizability
- Robust implementation
- Robust mechanism design
- Universal type space