An ascending auctions for independent values: Uniqueness and robustness to strategic uncertainty

Dirk Bergemann; Stephen Morris

doi:10.1257/aer.97.2.125

An ascending auctions for independent values: Uniqueness and robustness to strategic uncertainty

Dirk Bergemann
, Stephen Morris

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	125-130
Number of pages	6
Journal	American Economic Review
Volume	97
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.97.2.125
State	Published - May 2007

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

Economics and Econometrics

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title = "An ascending auctions for independent values: Uniqueness and robustness to strategic uncertainty",

author = "Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris",

year = "2007",

month = may,

doi = "10.1257/aer.97.2.125",

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pages = "125--130",

journal = "American Economic Review",

issn = "0002-8282",

publisher = "American Economic Association",

number = "2",

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T2 - Uniqueness and robustness to strategic uncertainty

AU - Bergemann, Dirk

AU - Morris, Stephen

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SP - 125

EP - 130

JO - American Economic Review

JF - American Economic Review

IS - 2

ER -

An ascending auctions for independent values: Uniqueness and robustness to strategic uncertainty

All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes

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